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C
rAbstract: We analyze the impact of remittances on the labor supply of men and
women in post-conflict Tajikistan. Individuals from remittance-receiving households
are less likely to participate in the labor market and supply fewer hours when they
do. The results are robust to different measures of remittances and migration. When
we differentiate between regions by their exposure to the 1992-1998 armed conflict,
we observe that the negative effect of remittances on the labor supply of women is
primarily driven by women from the regions more exposed to fighting and
destruction during the war. Remittances have a similar negative effect on the supply
of labor hours worked across all regions, both for men and women. Further, in the
households that do not have migrants, remittances have no effect on the labor
supply by males, suggesting that migration and not remittances is the primary factor
explaining male labor force participation.
JEL codes: J22, Time Allocation and Labor Supply; F22, International Migration; F24,
Remittances; O12, Microeconomics Analyses of Household Behavior
Keywords: Migration, Remittances, Labor markets, Tajikistan, Gender, Armed conflictIntroduction and motivation
Labor migration has become an important component of household coping strategies in
countries affected by armed conflict, either as an ex-ante reaction to the threat of conflict,
or an ex-post response to unstable economic and political conditions (Engel and Ibanez
2007, Czaikas and Kis-Katos 2009). The significance of labor migration in conflict-
affected countries is reflected in the large increase in remittances to migrant and refugee
exporting countries that have experienced recent political crises (Goldring 2002).
In this paper, we investigate the impact of remittances on individual labor supply in
post-conflict Tajikistan, a country that experienced some of the most significant migra-
tion flows in its recent history 1, but remains largely under-researched as a case study.
Based on the official data for Tajikistan (Table 1), around eight percent of the popula-
tion left the country between 1991 and 2005. About 83.8 percent of them left during
between 1991 and 1998, which overlaps with the 1992-1998 armed conflict in
Tajikistan. By 2005, almost every family in Tajikistan had sent at least one family mem-
ber abroad as a migrant worker (IMF 2005).
In line with the literature on effect of armed conflict on households and individuals,
in our analysis we differentiate between the regions by their exposure to the 1992-1998
armed conflict in Tajikistan. We analyze the differences in the impact of remittances
on the individual decision to participate in the labor market and on the number of2012 Shemyakina and Justino; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
eproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Table 1 Migration flows, Tajikistan 1991-2005 (thousand persons)









1991 74.9 101.3 −26.4 20.0 48.6 −28.6
1992 51.3 146.0 −94.7 11.3 104.7 −93.4
1993 71.4 146.1 −74.7 12.0 86.3 −74.3
1994 43.3 88.8 −45.5 6.6 55.1 −48.5
1995 37.1 74.9 −37.8 5.5 45.3 −39.8
1996 26.1 53.7 −27.6 3.7 34.1 −30.4
1997 20.2 37.0 −16.8 3.3 21.1 −17.8
1998 16.9 32.3 −15.4 2.7 17.6 −14.9
1999 14.7 28.8 −14.1 1.8 14.7 −12.9
2000 14.5 28.2 −13.7 1.7 14.6 −12.9
2001 16.7 29.1 −12.4 1.7 12.9 −11.2
2002 17.7 30.2 −12.5 1.4 12.0 −10.6
2003 16.9 27.9 −11.0 1.4 10.2 −8.8
2004 15.2 24.6 −9.4 1.1 7.9 −6.8
2005 18.0 27.3 −9.3 1.1 7.3 −6.2
Source: State Statistical Committee (2006).
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parison to individuals in regions less exposed to the war. To study this question, we use
individual and household-level data from the 2003 Tajik Living Standards Measurement
Study (henceforth, 2003 TLSS) survey. We combine these data with information on
violent events during the 1992-1998 civil war in Tajikistan based on two Russian-language
newspapers published in Tajikistan, reports by non-governmental organizations, mentions
of the conflict in books (e.g. Bliss 2010; Gomart 2003) and daily accounts of the 1992 and
1993 events that rely mostly on government records (Nazriev and Sattorov 2005, 2006).
The development literature has long recognized the importance of migration (and
resulting remittances) as a mechanism used by households in the times of peace to
secure income and improve welfare. There is a large literature that examines the impact
of remittances on a number of household-level economic outcomes such as consump-
tion decisions (Adams 2005), production (Damon 2010), schooling (Acosta 2006;
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2010) and labor supply (Acosta 2006; Amuedo-Dorantes
and Pozo 2006; Damon 2007; Hanson 2007). Studies on the relationship between remit-
tances and labor supply find that an increase in remittances has a negative effect on
labor hours supplied and labor force participation by men and women of working age
and that the effect is often greater for women. Authors suggest that remittances are a
source of non-labor income. An increase in non-labor income is often associated with
a decrease in the opportunity cost of leisure and the relaxation of credit constraints.
These effects in turn allow for a greater tolerance of risk and increased participation in
self-employment. Some of the studies focus on countries affected by conflict in the past
(e.g. El-Salvador (Acosta 2006; Damon 2007), Nicaragua (Funkhouser 1992)), but they
do not take directly into account the effect of conflict on the outcome of interest. This
approach may lead to potentially significant omitted variable bias since violent conflict
may affect the very structure of labor markets, as well as fundamental individual incen-
tives, tastes and preferences, leading households to make decisions in a way that differs
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Miguel 2010; Justino 2009, 2012).
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we examine the transfers from private
and institutional donors to households by their exposure to the 1992-1998 conflict in
Tajikistan. Second, we attempt to advance current understanding of the role of remit-
tances in post-conflict settings by looking at the differentiated ways in which individual
labor supply (of men and women aged 16-65) responds to remittance flows, differentiating
between communities by their exposure to the 1992-1998 armed conflict. Third, we con-
tribute to the emerging literature on the economic impact of armed conflict by analyzing
important labor market effects for civilians (e.g. Fernández et al. 2011; Menon and
Rodgers 2011).
Similar to previous literature, we find that the amount of remittances received by a
given household has an overall negative impact on the labor force participation and
hours supplied by men and women. In the full sample, the negative effect of remit-
tances is found to be stronger for men than for women. Such a result is intriguing as
previous research on the effects of remittances on labor supply has shown that female
labor supply is typically more responsive to changes in remittances (Amuedo-Dorantes
and Pozo 2006; Funkhouser 1992; Hanson 2007). The differences between our results
and those of the existing literature can be explained by the differences in the samples
used, as well as by the differences in the institutional settings. Notably, Tajikistan is a
country that is transitioning from the Soviet planned economy into an independent
one. The country also experienced a severe civil war that resulted in casualties amounting
to between 50,000 and 100,000 people, large population displacement and destruction of
industrial and agricultural assets (Bliss 2010; Falkingham 2000). When we differentiate by
community’s exposure to the conflict, we find that the labor force participation of women
in the communities that suffered from greater physical damage and loss of life during the
civil war is negatively associated with the receipt of remittances, suggesting that remit-
tances were used as a coping strategy by the households in these regions.
The next section discusses the main hypotheses tested in the paper and the concep-
tual framework. Section 3 discusses our empirical specification and the main independ-
ent variables of interest. Section 4 presents data and preliminary observations. Section
5 describes the main empirical results. The last section concludes the paper.
Conceptual framework and econometric specification
Conceptual framework
Previous empirical findings show that inflows of remittances are associated with reduc-
tions in the labor force participation of both men and women. In the neoclassical model
of labor-leisure choice (Killingsworth 1983), remittances can be interpreted as non-labor
income. Theoretically, an increase in non-labor income should increase household pur-
chasing power and reservation wages, therefore reducing the need of employment and the
number of hours supplied by remittance-receiving individuals (Killingsworth 1983). How-
ever, households may initially have to finance the outmigration of the household members
and some household members that stayed at home may have to enter the labor force to
repay for the migration costs. They may also be forced into the labor force if their labor
and the labor inputs of migrants are substitutes as suggested by Amuedo-Dorantes and
Pozo (2006).
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peace. If work migration is related to armed conflict, then analyses of the effects of remit-
tances in conflict-affected countries that do not account for the effect of conflict will suf-
fer from potential omitted variable bias. The effect of remittances on household economic
decisions, including migration and labor supply, in conflict-affected areas is unclear from
a theoretical point of view. First, exposure to conflict increases the likelihood of death,
injury and asset loss by household members. If remittances sent by a migrant household
member are a substitute for the loss of household adult workers, then it is possible that
the receipt of remittances will not yield any effects on the labor supply of household
members that stayed behind. Alternatively, remittances may be accompanied by increases
in labor participation of household members that stayed behind if the remittance funds
cannot entirely substitute for the loss of income. Recent studies also show that conflict
may affect risk perceptions (Voors et al. 2012) and shorten people’s planning horizons
(Bozzoli and Muller 2010). These changes in preferences may provide incentives for
people to remain employed even if remittances could substitute for wage employment.
We expect to observe significant differences between male and female responses to
remittances in conflict-affected areas. Armed conflict is associated with significant
changes in gender relations as women that would typically have stayed at home adopt
different roles to cope with the absence of males or with changes in the structure of so-
ciety (see Annan et al. 2011 for a discussion). One of such new roles is the breadwinner
role, where women who previously stayed at home join the labor force to provide for
their families. High levels of female-headship are often observed in communities
affected by violent conflict (Annan et al. 2011; Brück and Schindler 2009). In the con-
text of Tajikistan, war forced many widows to tend for themselves and their children.
Many men, especially, in the eastern Khatlon and Raions of Republican Subordination
could not leave their communities to find work in Tajikistan due to persecution, and
women had to take on jobs to provide for their families (Human Rights Watch 1993,
1995; Tadjbakhsh 1996). These new roles may contribute to changes in women’s prefer-
ences and attitudes whereby women will be reluctant to leave the labor market for the
fear of losing their newly found autonomy even in response to flows of non-wage
income to the household (such as remittances).
Econometric framework
We start the analysis of labor market outcomes by estimating key factors that may
affect an individual’s decision to actively participate in the labor market. We use indi-
vidual employment status in the 14 days prior to the survey as a proxy for workforce
participation 2. The empirical model is presented in Equation 1.
Eijnk ¼ αk þ Rjηþ Ziγ þ Cnβþ uijnk ð1Þ
where Einjk is a binary variable indicating whether an individual i living in household j,
primary sampling unit n and district k was employed in the 14 days preceding the sur-
vey 3. αk are district level fixed effects, Rj is the amount of remittances received by
household j in the 12 months prior to the survey.
Zi is a vector of individual, such as age, gender of and years of education completed
by an individual, and household characteristics, such as dependency ratio (number of
dependents to adults ages 16-65), female headship, household size and non-wage
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trict such as rural location.
To control for unobserved correlations of the observations within communities,
equation (1) is estimated using district-level fixed effects. This specification allows us to
include in the regressions characteristics that vary within districts, such as rural/urban
location. All regressions are estimated with robust standard errors clustered at the
district-level to control for the effect of unobserved heterogeneity. The fixed-effects
model eliminates all observed and unobserved community characteristics that are con-
stant across individuals from the same community. This removes any potential bias in
the estimation of labor supply caused by individual-invariant community characteris-
tics, assuming that these community effects do not interact with household and indi-
vidual characteristics. Since it is possible that some unobservable community
characteristics, such as availability of jobs, are correlated with remittances, the fixed
effects specification helps us to control for this correlation. We assume that there are
no omitted time-varying and region specific effects correlated with the remittances.
However, if there are omitted variables that are positively correlated with remittances,
such as an unobserved negative income shock 5, then the impact of remittances would
be overestimated.
As a robustness check, we also estimate regressions where the dependent variable is
the number of labor hours supplied in the 14 days prior to the survey. We use a Tobit
model to estimate the relationship between the amount of remittances received by a
household and the supply of labor hours by individual household members. The Tobit
model allows us to account for the zero-values of labor hours.
Yijnk ¼ αk þ λRj þ Ciθ þ Znμþ εijnk ð2Þ
with εi ∼Normal(0, δ
2) and
Yijnk ¼ max 0;Y ijnk
 
;
where Yijnk is the number of labor hours worked in the last week by a household mem-
ber aged 16-65. The variables in vectors R, Z and C are as listed above. All regressions
include district-level fixed-effects.
First stage equation: the effect of migration networks on remittances
As noted in studies that examine the effect of migration or remittances on labor market
outcomes at a household level, the likely endogeneity between migration and remit-
tances may present challenges to the estimation approach outlined above. The decision
to migrate may be correlated with unobserved household or individual characteristics
that are also correlated with the outcome of interest. Thus, a household member may
decide to migrate if she/he cannot find a job. Similarly, a migrant who is residing
abroad may send more money home if one of the household members loses his/her job
(e.g. Yang and Choi 2007). Thus, in the OLS estimation of the effect of remittances on
labor market outcomes, the estimated coefficient of interest may be biased. To deal
with this problem, we employ two-stage least squares procedure where we instrument
ln (remittances) using a variable that predicts the level of remittances but does not have
an impact on the outcome of interest other than through remittances.
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market outcomes. For example, people may migrate away from areas with poor labor
market conditions. In the context of armed conflict, people may migrate from areas
where infrastructure was destroyed the most and the likelihood of further investment
in local industry and other forms of employment is lower.
An instrument must satisfy two restrictions. First, it should be relevant: in other
words, the variation in the instrument must be related to the variation in the instru-
mented variable. Second, the instrument must satisfy the exclusion restriction, meaning
that it should not be related to the outcome of interest rather than through the instru-
mented variable (Wooldridge, 2002).
Drawing on a widely used approach (Acosta 2006; Azzarri and Zezza 2011 6; Binzel
and Assaad 2011; Chang et al. 2011; Damon 2007; McKenzie and Rapoport 2007;
Winters et al. 2001), we use the size of migration network defined at community (the
primary sampling unit) level, henceforth network, as our instrumental variable.
At the household level, the correlation between network and the natural logarithm
of remittances received is 0.167 and in the overall analytical sample it is 0.198 (both
coefficients are significant at the one percent level).
To estimate the effect of remittances on labor market participation, we use a two-
stage instrumental variable model (2SLS) and compare the results of 2SLS to the stand-
ard OLS estimates. In line with the literature, all specifications are estimated with
robust standard errors clustered at the district level.
The first stage of the model predicts the amount of remittances the household
receives each year.
Rjnk ¼ μ1 Networknk þ Zijnkδ þ Cnkγ þ εjnk ð3Þ
where Rjk is the amount of remittances received by a household j in a primary sampling
unit n in district k in the last 12 months. Networknk is the proportion of households in the
primary sampling unit n in district j that had migrants. Zijnk and Cnk are defined as above.
We examine the strength of the IV using an F-test and also by examining the R-
squared between regressions that include and exclude the instruments.
Measures of remittances and conflict
Measures of remittances
To account for possible measurement error in the self-reporting of the amount of
remittances received we use three measures of remittances. The first measure is a
dummy variable that is equal to one if a household receives any remittances. The sec-
ond measure is the natural logarithm of the amount of remittances received by the
household in the past 12 months from all private donors including family members,
relatives and neighbors located abroad and in Tajikistan. The third measure is the num-
ber of individuals who provided assistance to the household 7 in the past 12 months
(henceforth, remitters) and who lived abroad or in Tajikistan. This measure includes
people identified as remitters but for whom the household did not provide the amount
received. Using these variables instead of remittances, should help us to capture a pos-
sible recall bias and measurement error in the amount of monetary and in-kind trans-
fers reported by households, as it is possible that some households may fail to
accurately estimate total amount of remittances.
Justino and Shemyakina IZA Journal of Labor & Development 2012, 1:8 Page 7 of 28
http://www.izajold.com/content/1/1/8Conflict region variable
Tajikistan was affected by a violent civil war in the 1992-1993 that resulted in a pro-
tracted armed conflict that ended only in 1998. The main cause of the war was the
struggle for power between the post-communist government of Tajikistan and the
United Tajik Opposition (UTO). The government was affiliated with the clans from Kulob
(in eastern Khatlon) and Sugd regions. The UTO was at first supported by Gharmis and
Pamiris who populate parts of Khatlon, especially the former Kurgan-Tube region; Raions
of Republican Subordination (RRS) and Gorno-Badakshon Autonomous Oblast (GBAO)
(Capisani 2000). GBAO withdrew its support of the opposition in the early years of the
war (Bliss 2010). Prior to the war, GBAO received large amount of food supplies from
other regions of Tajikistan. During the 1992-1993, the only road from other parts of
Tajikistan to the capital of GBAO, Khorog was blocked by the fighting. This blockade 8
and massive inflows of refugees amounting between 30,000 and 50,000 people (Bliss 2010:
276) led to severe food shortages and even hunger in the region (Bliss 2010; Nazriev and
Sattorov 2005, 2006). The fighting and destruction were concentrated in the southern
region Khatlon, especially the western Khatlon, RRS (also known as Direct Rule Districts)
and the country-capital Dushanbe (Bliss 2010: pp. 273-275; Nazriev and Sattorov 2005,
2006). In western Khatlon (Kurgan-Tube region) and RRS, whole villages were burned
and population destroyed (Bliss 2010: pp. 273-275). Similar to GBAO, the northern region
Sugd was relatively unaffected by the 1992-1993 civil war as it is separated from other
areas of Tajikistan by a mountainous range.
We expect therefore to observe a significant impact of war exposure on household
economic decisions, including the supply of labor and the use of remittances. We ex-
plore this effect by introducing a dummy variable that is equal to one if a district
(raion) was severely affected by civil war events in 1992-1998 (henceforth, ‘conflict
region’). The exposure to conflict is based on the individual’s residence at the start of
the conflict in 1992. The assignment into ‘conflict region’ district is based on informa-
tion on the conflict related events 9 reported by two Russian language newspapers
published in Tajikistan 10, reports by various non-governmental organizations (e.g.
Human Rights Watch 1993, 1995), other studies on Tajikistan and two volumes based
on the Tajik government documents that chronicle the 1992 and 1993 events on a day
by day basis prepared by Nazriev and Sattorov (2005, 2006). We specify ‘conflict
region’ as an indicator variable that is equal to one for all districts in RRS, the capital
city of Dushanbe and most of the districts 11 in Khatlon region. Respectively, all
districts in Sugd and GBAO regions are assigned a value of zero. We recognize that
the effect of conflict exposure differed across regions and also examine differences in
household characteristics, remittances and migration across regions of Tajikistan. We
also interact the ‘conflict region’ dummy with the measures of remittances to examine
differences in labor supply responses by regional exposure to the conflict.
Data and preliminary observations
Data
The study uses household and individual data from the 2003 TLSS 12 survey that contains
information on household composition, employment, consumption and expenditure and
migration for 4,160 households. The survey is representative at the regional (four regions)
and urban/rural levels and has detailed information on monetary and in-kind transfers
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collected by the State Statistical Agency of Tajikistan and the World Bank.
We examine the monetary and in-kind transfers (as remittances are defined in the
survey) received in the past 12 months from private donors living abroad or in
Tajikistan. About 20.6 percent of the households interviewed in 2003 received such
transfers in the last 12 months, with 9.4 percent receiving remittances from abroad.
Among remitters who live abroad, 93 percent live in Russia, while the rest resides in
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and other countries 13.Preliminary observations
The summary statistics for households by their residence in ‘conflict region’ and by the
geographical region of residence are presented in Tables 2 and 3 respectively. Households
in ‘conflict region’ are about two percentage points more likely to be headed by women
and have lower education levels. They are three percentage points less likely to work in
the 14 days prior to the survey and four percentage points more likely to be unemployed
at the time of the survey (these differences are statistically significant at the one percent
level). Household heads in ‘conflict region’ are less likely to be married (significant at the
10 percent level). Their monthly earnings are similar across the regions and average about
30 somoni per month with most of the earnings paid in cash. Ten percent of household
heads in ‘conflict regions’ and eight percent of household heads ‘non-conflict regions’
migrated abroad for at least three months since 1998. They spent 4.74 and 3.73 months
abroad in 1998-2003 respectively (the differences are statistically significant at the one and
five percent level).
Households in ‘conflict regions’ are larger and have more children under six years
old, and children ages 7-15 compared to households in the rest of Tajikistan. The dif-
ferences are statistically significant at the one percent level. Households in ‘conflict re-
gion’ were 3 percentage points more likely to have migrants who lived abroad for at
least three months since 1998 (differences are significant at the one percent level).
Looking at the community characteristics, districts that were more affected by the con-
flict on an average have higher sex ratios of men to women based on the 1989 and
2000 census data.
Table 3 examines household characteristics according to the household’s residence in
one of administrative regions of Tajikistan: the capital city Dushanbe, and the regions
of Sugd, Khatlon, RRS and GBAO. In this analysis we split Khatlon region into Kulob
and Kurgan-Tube zones as they were two the distinct oblasts (regions) before the 1990
15. Kurgan-Tube group of districts suffered from a greater amount of damage according
to events described in Nazriev and Sattorov (2005, 2006).
In Dushanbe 32 percent of household heads are female compared to 20 percent in
RRS, 19 percent in Sugd, 17 percent in Kurgan-Tube and 14 and 13 percent in GBAO
and Kulob zones respectively. Household heads in Dushanbe are also younger, only 61
percent of them work, and they have significantly higher earnings than household
heads from the rest of Tajikistan. Further, households in RRS, Kurgan-Tube and Kulob
have the largest number of children under six years old, and ages 7-15, highest
dependency ratios and larger households, e.g. 7.6 in RRS vs. 4.5 household members in
Dushanbe.









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Household head characteristics
Age, years 48.88 48.67 49.01 −0.34
HH head is female (indicator) 0.20 0.18 0.21 −0.02 ***
Married (indicator) 0.77 0.78 0.77 0.01*
Education 11.07 11.28 10.93 0.36***
Worked last 14 days (indicator) 0.67 0.69 0.66 0.03 ***
In the workforce (indicator) 0.70 0.73 0.68 0.05 ***
Not employed last 14 days (indicator) 0.29 0.27 0.31 −0.04 ***
Total monthly earnings (all types), somoni 30.49 31.34 29.93 1.41
Monthly wages (monetary), somoni 28.93 28.82 29.00 −0.18
Migrated abr for 3+ months since 1998 0.09 0.08 0.10 −0.02 ***
Mean number of months spent abroad 4.31 3.73 4.74 −1.01 **
Household characteristics
Household size 6.38 5.90 6.68 −0.78 ***
Dependents (under 16 & 66+)/
(Adults 16-65)
1.02 0.89 1.10 −0.22 ***
N of children ages 0 – 6 1.14 0.97 1.25 −0.28 ***
N of children ages 7 - 15 1.49 1.25 1.65 −0.40 ***
N of elderly 66 and above 0.24 0.24 0.24 −0.01
ln (non-wage income) 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.00 ***
Adults age 16-65 in a household 3.50 3.44 3.54 −0.09
N currently at home migrants 0.27 0.23 0.29 −0.05 **
has a migrant who was abr for
3+ months since 1998
0.20 0.17 0.21 −0.04 ***
Community characteristics
SR: all men to women in 1989 1.01 0.97 1.03 −0.05 ***
SR: all men to women in 2000 1.00 1.00 1.01 −0.01 ***
SR: men to women age 15-64 in 1989 1.00 0.97 1.03 −0.06 ***
SR: men to women age 15-64 in 2000 0.99 0.99 1.00 −0.01 ***
Proportion of households with
migrants in psu
0.20 0.17 0.21 −0.04 ***
Kulob 0.09 0.03 0.13
Kurgan-Tube 0.21 0.00 0.34
Sugd 0.35 0.90 0.00
GBAO 0.03 0.08 0.00
RRS 0.19 0.00 0.32
Dushanbe 0.13 0.00 0.22
N 4160 1780 2380
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimates are weighted by inverse sampling
probability. ‘SR’ stands for sex ratio, ‘workforce’ – includes employed and actively looking for work individuals.
Data source: Authors calculations using data from TLSS (2003). ‘Conflict region’ as defined in sub-section "Conflict region
variable". Sex ratios were calculated population data collected by the State Statistical Committee (2002).
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Table 3 Household demographic characteristics by region of residence
Variable GBAO Sugd Kurgan Kulob Dushanbe RRS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Household head characteristics
Age, years 50.73 48.47 48.14 51.08 46.16 50.92
HH head is female (indicator) 0.14 0.19 0.17 0.13 0.32 0.20
Married (indicator) 0.82 0.77 0.82 0.83 0.66 0.78
Education 11.66 11.27 10.66 10.59 12.25 10.42
Worked last 14 days (indicator) 0.76 0.68 0.72 0.65 0.61 0.64
In the workforce (indicator) 0.77 0.72 0.73 0.66 0.66 0.65
Not employed last 14 days (indicator) 0.22 0.27 0.27 0.34 0.32 0.31
Total monthly earnings (all types), somoni 26.46 31.17 23.73 32.48 50.92 22.33
Monthly wages (monetary), somoni 25.83 28.40 22.80 31.76 49.92 21.39
Migrated abr for 3+ months since 1998 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.17
Mean number of months spent abroad 5.64 3.17 2.15 0.62 3.13 10.61
Household characteristics
Household size 6.33 5.80 7.01 7.10 4.59 7.63
Dependents (under 16 & 66+)/(Adults 16-65) 0.91 0.87 1.22 1.21 0.89 1.08
N of children ages 0-6 0.90 0.96 1.35 1.40 0.81 1.40
N of children ages 7-15 1.29 1.22 1.88 1.73 1.03 1.82
N of elderly 66 and above 0.30 0.23 0.20 0.30 0.16 0.31
Ln (non-wage income) 1.41 0.92 0.82 1.05 0.84 1.11
Adults age 16-65 in a household 3.83 3.39 3.58 3.67 2.59 4.10
N currently at home migrants 0.24 0.24 0.19 0.06 0.19 0.54
has a migrant who was abr for 3+ months since 1998 0.15 0.18 0.14 0.05 0.15 0.39
Community characteristics
SR: all men to women in 1989 1.04 0.97 0.99 0.98 0.96 1.12
SR: all men to women in 2000 1.02 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.03 1.01
SR: men to women age 15-64 in 1989 1.04 0.96 0.98 0.96 1.00 1.12
SR: men to women age 15-64 in 2000 1.02 0.99 0.99 0.94 1.03 1.01
Proportion of households with migrants in psu 0.15 0.18 0.14 0.05 0.15 0.39
N 480 1260 740 320 660 700
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimates are weighted by inverse sampling
probability. ‘Kurgan’ and ‘Kulob’ stand for districts in Kurgan-Tube and Kulob zones respectively that are defined in ft. 15.
‘SR’ stands for sex ratio, ‘workforce’ – includes employed and actively looking for work individuals. Data source: as for
Table 2.
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http://www.izajold.com/content/1/1/8In RRS, Dushanbe, Sugd and Kurgan-Tube zone respectively, 17, 10, 9 and 7 percent of
household heads migrated for work abroad for 3 months and more, followed by a much
smaller percentage in GBAO and Kulob. The longest period abroad between 1998 and
2003 was spent by household heads from RRS and GBAO at 10.6 and 5.6 months respect-
ively. Households from Kulob have the lowest number of migrants currently at home and
of these who have ever migrated abroad in 1998-2003 at 0.06 persons and 0.05 persons re-
spectively. These numbers are almost three times lower than these for other regions.
Households in RRS region had 0.54 migrants currently at home and 0.39 migrants who
have ever been abroad for at least 3 months and more since 1998. These numbers suggest
interesting dynamics. While most of the districts in the Kulob zone are included in the
definition of ‘conflict region’, the migration patterns there are substantially different than
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‘conflict region’. One of the main differences between the two regions is that the “Kulobi”
(clans from Kulob district) were on the winning side in the war (Bliss 2010) and members
of Kulobi clans were less likely to migrate abroad for the fear of retribution as suggested
by Tadjbakhsh (1996). Some Gharmis (people from Gharm districts in RRS and some
communities in Kurgan-Tube) were fighting against Kulobis in the war, and in the post-
conflict period had difficulties with employment as they were viewed ‘guilty’ by associ-
ation. Men who ventured outside of their villages and houses were subject to beatings and
persecution by the police (Human Rights Watch 1995). These difficulties may have
induced them to look for jobs elsewhere.
Table 4 presents summary statistics on remittances by the type of donor (private and
institutional), type of transfer (monetary or in-kind) and donor’s location (in Tajikistan
or abroad). The number suggest that households in ‘conflict region’ receive larger
amounts of in-kind transfers from Tajikistan, monetary remittances from abroad and









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Private remittances
Monetary remittances from TJ 33.61 34.46 33.05 1.41
In-kind remittances from TJ 10.38 8.78 11.40 −2.62 **
Total private remittances from TJ 43.98 43.24 44.45 −1.21
Monetary remittances from abroad 62.88 53.45 68.93 −15.48 *
In-kind remittances from abroad 1.78 1.92 1.69 0.23
Total private remittances from abroad 64.66 55.37 70.62 −15.25 *
N of private donors in Tajikistan 0.14 0.13 0.14 −0.01
N of private donors abroad 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.00 *
Institutional remittances
Monetary remittances from TJ 0.18 0.09 0.24 −0.14
In-kind institutional remittances from TJ 3.22 1.08 4.59 −3.52 ***
Total institutional remittances from TJ 3.40 1.17 4.83 −3.66 ***
Monetary remittances from abroad 1.70 0.10 2.73 −2.64 *
In-kind institutional remittances from abroad 15.54 28.17 7.43 20.75 ***
Total institutional remittances from abroad 17.24 28.27 10.16 18.11 ***
N of donors-institutions in Tajikistan 0.04 0.02 0.05 −0.04 ***
N of donors-institutions abroad 0.12 0.21 0.07 0.14 ***
Overall
Dummy for a private donor, any 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.00
Dummy for donor-hh head/spouse 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.00
Number of institutional donors 0.16 0.23 0.12 0.11 ***
Dummy variable for donor-institution 0.16 0.21 0.12 0.09 ***
All private remittances, TJ+abr 110.05 99.31 116.95 −17.64 **
All institutional remittances, TJ+abr 20.70 29.60 14.99 14.61 ***
N 4160 1780 2380
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Estimates are weighted by inverse sampling probability. ‘donor’ – a sender of remittances/ transfers as defined in the
2003 TLSS. ‘SR’ stands for sex ratio, ‘workforce’ – includes employed and actively looking for work individuals. Data
source: Authors’ calculations using TLSS (2003).
Table 5 Migration and remittance descriptive statistics by households’ region of
residence
Variable GBAO Sugd Kurgan Kulob Dushanbe RRS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Private remittances
Monetary remittances from TJ 10.45 35.11 25.88 56.09 56.50 16.92
In-kind private remittances from TJ 2.52 8.86 8.37 22.73 19.56 4.60
Total private remittances from TJ 12.97 43.96 34.25 78.82 76.06 21.52
Monetary remittances from abroad 46.98 55.70 19.47 25.24 63.90 140.65
In-kind private remittances from abroad 0.71 2.08 0.12 0.00 2.31 3.60
Total private remittances from abroad 47.69 57.79 19.59 25.24 66.21 144.25
N of private donors in Tajikistan 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.22 0.20 0.08
N of private donors abroad 0.16 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.16
Institutional remittances
Monetary remittances from TJ 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.73
In-kind institutional remittances from TJ 0.96 1.12 6.06 0.25 3.12 5.76
Total institutional remittances from TJ 0.96 1.22 6.06 0.25 3.12 6.49
Monetary remittances from abroad 0.07 0.06 3.05 2.94 0.08 4.01
In-kind institutional remittances from abroad 203.68 12.96 9.83 21.18 2.01 3.94
Total institutional remittances from abroad 203.75 13.03 12.88 24.12 2.10 7.95
N of donors-institutions in Tajikistan 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.09
N of donors-institutions abroad 1.07 0.13 0.08 0.18 0.04 0.06
Overall
Dummy for a private donor, any 0.23 0.20 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.22
Dummy for donor-hh head/spouse 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.07
Number of institutional donors 1.08 0.15 0.10 0.18 0.11 0.15
Dummy variable for donor-institution 0.96 0.14 0.10 0.18 0.11 0.15
All private remittances, TJ+abr 62.95 102.33 53.98 107.28 147.90 166.22
All institutional remittances, TJ+abr 204.71 14.43 18.94 24.37 5.22 14.44
N 480 1260 740 320 660 700
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Estimates are weighted by inverse sampling probability. ‘Kurgan’ and ‘Kulob’ stand for districts in Kurgan-Tube and Kulob
zones respectively that are defined in ft. 15. Data source: Authors' calculations using TLSS (2003).
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amounts of in-kind remittances from institutional donors located abroad. In overall,
households in ‘conflict region’ received 17.6 somoni more per year from private donors
and 14.6 somoni less from institutional donors (all sources and types of income) than
households in regions less affected by conflict (the differences are statistically signifi-
cant at least at the 5 percent level).
Examining remittances and other transfers by region of residence (Table 5), we can see that
the remittances in the ‘conflict region’ are driven by the sample of households in the RRS re-
gion and Dushanbe, who received the largest amount of remittances from abroad at 166.22
and 147.90 somoni per year. Kulobi residents received 107.3 somoni in remittances, with 73
percent of remittances coming from Tajikistan, while in Dushanbe and RRS remittances from
Tajikistan represented only 51 percent and 13 percent of the total private remittances. GBAO
was the leader in institutional remittances with households on an average receiving 204.71
somoni per year. Other regions received eight (Kulob zone) to 39 (Dushanbe) times less from
institutional sources compared to GBAO. High institutional transfers reported by households
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by the Aga-Khan Foundation (AKF) for economic development.
According to Tadjbakhsh (1996), there is a long tradition in Tajikistan, especially in
the mountains of Gharm (located in RRS), to diversify household income by sending
some of the household members abroad. Our data supports her observation, as house-
holds in RRS report the largest amounts of remittances from abroad and this region is
a home to larger migration networks. Recent research suggests that migrants who have
access to an established migrant network in the migrant-receiving countries are more
likely to have access to jobs than individuals who did not have access to such networks
(Munshi 2003; Beaman 2012).
In Table 6, we estimate the effect of household level characteristics on the level of remit-
tances. Remittances are negatively associated with age and education level of the house-
hold’s head and are higher for households headed by women. They are also positively
associated with non-wage income received by the household. The estimated coefficients are
statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level. Among the community-level covariates
(Columns 2-7), the size of migration network is consistently positively associated with
remittances. Regional dummy variables have no statistically significant association with
remittances when we control for other household and community characteristics (Column
6). District-level sex ratio of men to women in 1989 is also positively associated with remit-
tances, this variable drops out of the estimation when we add fixed effects at the district
level (Column 7), while the estimated coefficients on all other covariates remain stable.
Figures 1 and 2 present average employment rates and hours worked by men and
women by their age and household’s remittance receiving status. The summary statis-
tics for the analytical sample are shown in Table 12 in Appendix. The receipt of remit-
tances appears to have a significant impact on labor supply of men and women aged
16-65. Men from remittance-receiving households are less likely to be employed
(Figure 1, top panel). Further, conditional on employment, women 16-50 in the
remittance-receiving households work fewer hours than those in households that
do not receive remittances (Figure 2, bottom panel).
These descriptive results suggest that there could be significant differences in individ-
ual labor force participation and labor hours supplied based on the household-
remittance receiving status and residence in conflict ‘region’. The following section
explores these relationships in an econometric framework.
Empirical results
Employment
Table 7 reports results of the OLS regressions where the dependent variable is whether
an individual was employed in the 14 days prior to the survey 16. All regressions
include controls for age, age squared, education level, non-wage income, household de-
pendency ratio, indicators for an individual being married, female household head, rural
residence dummy and fixed effects at the district level.
In Panel A we present results for men. Column 1 presents the baseline model results,
where ln(total private remittances) is the main variable of interest 17. In Column 2, we
add an interaction term between the ln(remittances) and the ‘conflict region’ dummy
variable. In columns 3-4 we replace the ln (remittances) with a dummy variable for a
household receiving any remittances. In Columns 5 and 6, we replace ln (remittances)
Table 6 Correlates of private remittances at a household level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FE
Age −0.020*** −0.019*** −0.018*** −0.019*** −0.018*** −0.019*** −0.019***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Years of education completed −0.088*** −0.087*** −0.075*** −0.087*** −0.075*** −0.079*** −0.079***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Married 0.197 0.207 0.169 0.191 0.167 0.164 0.121
(0.189) (0.188) (0.188) (0.189) (0.188) (0.188) (0.182)
Rural −0.28 −0.175 −0.368** −0.302* −0.375** −0.276 −0.445
(0.170) (0.183) (0.160) (0.169) (0.159) (0.185) (0.273)
Household size 0.026 0.026 0.012 0.025 0.012 0.014 0.023
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
Dependents (under 16
+66&above)/Adults 16-65)
−0.109** −0.096* −0.068 −0.109** −0.070 −0.072 −0.076
(0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.054) (0.055) (0.054) (0.054)
Household head is female 0.420** 0.409** 0.434*** 0.426*** 0.436*** 0.466*** 0.450***
(0.160) (0.161) (0.156) (0.159) (0.156) (0.156) (0.149)
ln (non-wage income) 0.105*** 0.101*** 0.093*** 0.102*** 0.092*** 0.083** 0.076**
(0.037) (0.037) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036)
Conflict region −0.092 −0.216 −0.174 −0.108 −0.178 −0.235
(0.136) (0.167) (0.125) (0.135) (0.124) (0.365)
ln distance to regional center −0.064
(0.040)
Proportion of households with
migrants in psu
2.087*** 2.034*** 2.447*** 2.829***
(0.317) (0.324) (0.411) (0.525)















Constant 2.853*** 2.984*** 2.438*** 2.486*** 2.297*** 2.117*** 2.279***
(0.362) (0.384) (0.381) (0.371) (0.383) (0.366) (0.382)
N 4061 4061 4061 4061 4061 4061 4061
R squared 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.05
Adjusted R squared 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.05
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
‘Kurgan’ and ‘Kulob’ stand for districts in Kurgan-Tube and Kulob zones respectively as defined in ft. 15. Reference
category: resident of Sugd (Column 6). The dependent variable is the ln(remittances from private sources). All regressions
are estimated with robust standard errors clustered at the district of residence level. Regression in Col. 7 is estimated
with district-level fixed effects. ‘psu’ – primary sampling unit.
Data source: as for Table 2.
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Note: Top graph: Men. Bottom graph: Women.
Figure 1 Average employment rate in the 14 days prior to survey date by age, gender and
household remittance-receiving status. Age 16-65. Source: Authors’ calculations using TLSS 2003.
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in Tajikistan. We then repeat this analysis for women and present results in Panel B.
The estimated coefficients on the natural logarithm of annual remittances and the dummy
variable for a household receiving remittances are negative and statistically significant (Col-
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Note: Top graph: Men. Bottom graph: Women.
Figure 2 Average weekly labor hours (excluding zeros) by gender and household remittance-
receiving status. Age 16-65. Source: Authors’ calculations using TLSS 2003.
Table 7 Employment, remittances and conflict
Panel A: Men Panel B: Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Ln(total remittances from abroad & Tajikistan) −0.015*** −0.010* −0.008*** −0.002
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
Conflict region*Ln(total remittances) −0.009- 0.010**
(0.007) (0.005)
Receives remittances (dummy) −0.086*** −0.061** −0.044*** −0.006
(0.020) (0.028) (0.016) (0.023)
Conflict region*Receives remittances −0.048 −0.065**
(0.039) (0.030)
N of private remitters abroad −0.081*** −0.035 −0.028 −0.001
(0.026) (0.034) (0.017) (0.021)
N of private remitters in Tajikistan −0.039** −0.04 −0.032** −0.009
(0.016) (0.027) (0.014) (0.021)
Conflict region*N remitters abroad −0.085* −0.047
(0.047) (0.032)
Conflict region*N remitters in Tajikistan 0.003 −0.035
(0.033) (0.028)
N 6552 6552 6552 6552 6552 6552 7351 7351 7351 7351 7351 7351
R squared 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
OLS models. Dependent variable: employed in the last 14 days.
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions control for age, age squared, education level, non-wage income, household dependency ratio, indicators for being married, female
household head and rural residence, and a constant term. All regressions include district-level fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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households without remittances. Both effects are significant at the one percent level.
Individuals from households who have remitters abroad and in Tajikistan are also less
likely to be employed (Columns 5 and 11). The effect is again higher for men. The probabil-
ity of male employment declines by 8.1 percentage points for each additional remitter living
abroad (significant at the 1 percent level), and by 3.9 percentage points (significant at the 5
percent level) for each additional remitter in Tajikistan. Having a remitter abroad does not
have a statistically significant impact on female employment. However, having access to one
additional remitter in Tajikistan reduces women’ employment by 3.2 percentage points
(Column 11). This result is significant at the 5 percent level. The estimated coefficients for
the number of remitters abroad or in Tajikistan are not statistically significantly different
from each other (Columns 5 and 11) in the regressions for men and women. However, we
present separate results for remitters who live in Tajikistan and abroad, so we can evaluate
the impact of funds coming from remitters by their place of residence 18.
Next, we examine the effect of interactions between ‘conflict region’ dummy variable
and household’s remittances measures 19. The interaction term between ‘conflict region’
dummy and receipt of remittances is not statistically significantly different from zero in
the regressions for men (Columns 2 and 4). In the regressions for the sample of women,
both the amount and the fact of receiving remittances have a negative and statistically sig-
nificant impact on female employment of women in ‘conflict region’, with the estimated
coefficient on the stand-alone remittance variables becoming statistically insignificant.
Tobit regressions – labor hours supply
As a robustness check, we have also estimated regressions where ‘hours worked in the
last 14 days’ is used as the main dependent variable (Table 8). This variable was
obtained from the 2003 TLSS, Module 5, Section B, questions 3 and 5. We use Tobit
models to control for the censoring in the dependent variable. As in Table 7, we
include controls for individual and household characteristics, rural location and district
level fixed effects 20. The results are reported separately for men and women.
As in Table 7, we observe that measures of remittances have a negative and statisti-
cally significant effect on the hours of work reported by both men and women. When
we differentiate the analysis by ‘conflict region’ dummy variable, for men the results do
not change. When we consider the female sample, we observe that the estimated coeffi-
cients on the stand-alone remittance measures are smaller. The estimated coefficients
on the interactions of ‘conflict region’ dummy and three measures of remittances are
mostly not statistically significantly different from zero, except for the interaction term
between the ‘conflict region’ dummy and the number of remitters in Tajikistan.
Instrumental variable estimation
To account for potential reverse causality between labor supply and remittances, we
resort to instrumental variables estimation methods. Table 9 presents results from the
IV-2SLS and IV-Tobit regressions where the dependent variable is an individual’s em-
ployment status, and hours worked in the 14 days prior to the survey, respectively.
Panel A presents results for the full sample and Panel B for the sample of individuals
from ‘conflict region’. The main independent variable of interest is ln (remittances
received by households in the past 12 months from household members and abroad
Table 8 Hours worked, remittances and conflict exposure
Panel A: Men Panel B: Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Ln(total remittances from abroad and Tajikistan) −2.046*** −2.214*** −1.086*** −0.612
(0.234) (0.352) (0.253) (0.398)
Conflict region*Ln(total remittances) 0.312 −0.819
(0.460) (0.514)
Receives remittances (dummy) −11.769*** −13.252*** −6.402*** −3.863*
(1.363) (1.983) (1.485) (2.213)
Conflict region*Receives remittances 2.821 −4.582
(2.674) (2.978)
N of private remitters abroad −11.158*** −10.275*** −4.308*** −3.631
(1.641) (2.317) (1.621) (2.461)
N of private remitters in Tajikistan −4.975*** −7.189*** −4.726*** −1.042
(1.400) (1.981) (1.554) (2.437)
Conflict region*N remitters abroad −1.696 −1.161
(3.204) (3.265)
Conflict region*N remitters in Tajikistan 3.958 −6.140*
(2.707) (3.223)
N 7119 7119 7119 7119 7119 7119 7402 7402 7402 7402 7402 7402
Log likelihood −24148 −24148 −24151 −24150 −24152 −24151 −20128 −20127 −20128 −20127 −20129 −20127
N of left-censored obs 2661 2661 2661 2661 2661 2661 3949 3949 3949 3949 3949 3949
Tobit models. Dependent variable: hours worked in the last 14 days.
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions control for age, age squared, education level, non-wage income, household dependency ratio, indicators for being married, female
household head and rural residence, and a constant term. All regressions include district-level fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.






















Table 9 Instrumental variable estimation: employment, hours worked and remittances
Panel A: Full sample Panel B: Conflict region
IV-2SLS IV-Tobit IV-2SLS IV-Tobit
Employed last 40 days Hours worked last 14d Employed last 40 days Hours worked last 14d
men women men women men women men women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln (total remittances) −0.071*** −0.017 −11.509*** −3.821*** −0.068*** −0.016 −7.562*** −0.517
(0.026) (0.019) (1.590) (1.328) (0.025) (0.031) (1.972) (1.804)
N 6552 7351 7119 7402 3624 4238 3982 4255
R squared 0.17 0.12 0.19 0.12
Log likelihood −39903.35 −36687.28 −21875.84 −20931.03
N of left-censored obs 2661 3949 1549 2305
Robust F (1, 62) (ln(remittances) is endogeneous)-first stage 6.60 0.22 4.52 0.22
p-value 0.01 0.64 0.04 0.64
First-stage summary stats endogenenous regressor: ln (remittances)
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Adj. R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Partial R-squared 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03
Robust F (1, 62) (Natwork=0) 23.92 30.10 11.20 15.07
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Weak instrument test 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Min.eigenvalue statistic=F-stat.“network=0” 161.64 235.94 75.36 116.17
2SLS Size of nominal 5% Wald test 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38
IV-Tobit
Wald test of exogeneity 37.18 4.39 8.90 0.22
p-value 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.64
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions controls for age, age squared, education level, non-wage income, household dependency ratio, indicators for being married, female
household head and rural residence, residence in ‘conflict region’ and a constant term. All regressions include district-level fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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sampling unit) level size of the migration network as defined in section 3. This variable
is highly correlated with remittances as shown by the F-statistics from the first stage
OLS regressions. The F-test and Wald tests for endogeneity of ln (remittances) suggest
that this variable is endogenous for the labor supply of men, but exogenous with re-
spect to employment of women (F value=0.22). In the IV-Tobit estimations for women
in Column 4, we can see that ln (remittances) is endogenous with respect to hours
worked (Panel A, Column 4), but exogenous for women from the ‘conflict region’
(Panel B, Column 8).
The estimated coefficient on the ln (remittances) in the IV models is 4.7 times higher
(Table 9, Column 1) compared to its OLS estimate in Table 7 (Column 1) for men (signifi-
cant at the 1 percent level). While an IV estimate of the coefficient on ln (remittances) in
the IV-2SLS regressions for women is slightly higher (Column 2) that its OLS estimate, it
is not statistically significant at a conventional level. In the IV-Tobit estimations, the esti-
mated coefficients on the instrumented value of ln (remittances) are also negative and are
substantially higher than their estimates in Table 8 (Columns 1 and 7).
Table 9 includes summary statistics from the first-stage regressions that are useful for
identifying weak instruments. The R-squared and the adjusted R-squared are only 0.09
and 0.08 in the IV regressions for men and women. This result suggests a loss of preci-
sion associated with the IV estimation, which is expected. The partial R-squared is only
0.02 in the regressions for men and 0.03 in the regressions for women. The F-statistic
values are 23.92 and 30.10 for the full sample (Panel A) of men and women and 11.2
and 15.07 for the ‘conflict region’ sub-sample (Panel B) which is greater than the rule-
of-thumb value of 10. The test of Stock and Yogo (2005 : p. 84) gives us a Wald test
value of 16.38 based on 2SLS estimator. We reject the hypothesis of weak instrument
presence at the 5 percent significance level Cameron and Trivedi (2009: pp. 192-193).
As the sign of the estimated coefficient on the variable of interest is consistent between
the IV-2SLS and the OLS, and the IV-Tobit and Tobit models, and the measure of remit-
tances is not endogenous to the female labor supply, we assume that our OLS and Tobit
model coefficient estimates on this variable are accurate with respect to the sign of the rela-
tionship. While the OLS models here provide us with lower coefficient estimates than in-
strumental variable models, we are comfortable with trading the precision of the IV-
estimates for efficiency of the OLS and continue our analysis and discussion using the OLS
framework.
Effect of migration vs. remittances
One potential explanation for the lower effect of remittances on female labor supply in
Tajikistan may have to do with the fact that remittances in households where women
work may not be sufficient to compensate for a loss of wages if women were to stay
home 21. It is also possible that the negative effect of migration on household income
and the necessity to substitute for the labor of migrated household members in the
household production is greater than the income effect of remittances. Since migration
of household members and remittances can have opposing effects on household labor
supply, we attempt to separate these two events following a strategy used by Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo (2010). Some of the households in Tajikistan receive remittances
but do not have household members who migrated abroad for work in the past five
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http://www.izajold.com/content/1/1/8years. We take advantage of this diversity and separate the sample into households that
have former migrants and households that do not have such migrants 22. In effect, we
separate the migration effect from the effect of remittances by focusing our attention
on the labor supply of household members residing in non-migrant households
(Table 10). The OLS estimate of the coefficient on ln (remittances) in the regressions
with dependent variable being employed in the last 14 days in the sub-sample for men is
only 1/3 of the OLS estimate for the full sample (0.005 vs. 0.015) and it is not statistically
significant. The estimated coefficients on the dummy for the receipt of remittances or
number of remitters abroad are not statistically significant either alone or when interacted
with ‘conflict region’ dummy variable. Only the presence of remitters located in Tajikistan
is statistically significantly negatively associated with a decreased supply of labor by men.
Thus, it appears that the negative effect of remittances and migration on the labor force
participation of men is primarily felt through the channel of migration than remittances.
Since, it is men who are mostly migrants, the negative effect of migration that we observe
in the data may be simply related to them waiting for their next spell of migration to start.
In Table 10, the effect of remittances on the labor supply by women is statistically signifi-
cantly different from zero only for women in ‘conflict region’ (Columns 8 and 10) and the
estimated coefficients of interest are slightly higher than their estimates in Table 7.Discussion and conclusion
The aim of this paper is to estimate the impact of remittances on the labor supply of
working age men and women in post-conflict Tajikistan. Similarly to previous literature,
we find that the amount of remittances received by a household has an overall negative
impact on the labor force participation and labor hours supplied by men and women aged
16-65. Our results also show that the effect of remittances is stronger for men than for
women. However, when we interact remittance measures with the ‘conflict region’ indica-
tor, we observe that female labor supply is negatively associated with the receipt of remit-
tances only in ‘conflict regions’. The stronger effect of remittances on the labor market
participation by women in ‘conflict regions’ is consistent with remittances being used as a
coping strategy, where women from remittance receiving households may exit less desir-
able jobs in informal sector as found by other studies (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006).
Conditional on employment, remittances are negatively associated with the number of
hours worked. Results using extensive and intensive measures of labor market participa-
tion indicate that remittances in ‘conflict region’ primarily affect female entry into employ-
ment. Once women are employed, the receipt of remittances does not have an impact on
their hours of work. Only access to remitters in Tajikistan reduces hours of work by
women suggesting their preference for economic security.
In the households that do not have migrants but have reported receiving remittances,
remittances have no statistically significant effect on the labor supply by men, suggest-
ing that the primary channel of reduction in labor supply is labor migration at the
household level. In Tajikistan, most of the labor migrants are male (Olimova and Bosc
2003). Thus men may reduce their labor supply in the local market as they expect to
migrate in the near future since the differences in wages across countries are substan-
tial 23. The regression results where we include a dummy variable for an individual
being a former labor migrant support this interpretation 24.
Table 10 Sample of households that do not have return migrants: labor force participation, remittances and conflict
Panel A: Men Panel B: Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Ln(total remittances from abroad and Tajikistan) −0.005 −0.001 −0.005 0.003
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Conflict region*Ln(total remittances) −0.007 −0.014**
(0.008) (0.006)
Receives remittances (dummy) −0.028 −0.008 −0.025 0.016
(0.022) (0.033) (0.023) (0.024)
Conflict region*Receives remittances −0.038 −0.076**
(0.043) (0.038)
N of private remitters abroad 0.007 0.04 0.012 0.017
(0.034) (0.042) (0.034) (0.020)
N of private remitters in tajikistan −0.037** −0.039 −0.032** −0.003
(0.014) (0.025) (0.014) (0.027)
Conflict region*N remitters abroad −0.074 −0.012
(0.063) (0.075)
Conflict region*N remitters in Tajikistan 0.004 −0.041
(0.030) (0.031)
N 5220 5220 5220 5220 5220 5220 5696 5696 5696 5696 5696 5696
R squared 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions controls for age, age squared, education level, non-wage income, household dependency ratio, indicators for being married, female
household head and rural residence, and a constant term. All regressions include district-level fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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be also explained by the fact that if households that have been receiving remittances or
had migrant household members for a long time, such households may have adjusted
their consumption instead of their labor supply. The difference in consumption expen-
ditures between households that receive remittances and those that do not is very
small. There could also be an issue with respect to who controls the distribution of
remittances. If women do not have access to remittances in a household Tajikistan as
suggested by a recent ODIHR- OSCE (2012) report 25, then we should not observe sig-
nificant changes in the labor supply of women in response to remittances. Unfortu-
nately available data do not allow us to test this hypothesis further.
A final set of possible explanations is related to individual attitudes and preferences to-
wards risk: the lower response of women’s labor supply to remittances may have to do
with women being more risk averse. There is a large literature that studies economic deci-
sion making and risk attitudes of men and women, suggesting that women are more risk
averse than men (see review by Croson and Gneezy 2009). At the moment there are no
data available to test this hypothesis explicitly in the case of Tajikistan as this would re-
quire an experimental research design. This area of research should be explored for fur-
ther work on individual behavior in conflict settings. For instance, Voors et al. (2012)
report significant changes in tastes, preferences and risk aversion in conflict situations.
The results presented in the paper offer several important contributions to the literature
on the effects of remittances on households in developing economies. Firstly, the results
show strong evidence for the differential way in which men and women respond to remit-
tances with respect to their labor supply decisions. This observation provides a further
evidence for the importance of research on intra-household decision-making processes, as
well as on the differences in labor supply decisions by gender. Secondly, the study illus-
trates that migration of household members is the primary factor explaining reduced labor
supply by men in household that receive remittances. Further, entry into employment by
women is only responsive to remittances in ‘conflict regions’ but not in other parts of
Tajikistan. Analyses using only remittances or only conflict data may provide an incom-
plete picture of labor supply decisions between and within households. Our results motiv-
ate further research on how households respond to multiple events.Endnotes
1 Tajikistan receives 0.4 – 1 billion US dollars in remittances every year which
amounts to 20 - 50 percent of total GDP (Kireyev 2006). In comparison, remittances in
Bangladesh, Egypt and Morocco – traditionally some of the highest remittance-
receiving countries in the world – represent around 10 percent of total GDP. In the
dataset, remittances from family members and other relatives in Tajikistan constitute
about 23 percent of total household expenditure for those households that report re-
ceiving remittances (authors’ calculations using TLSS 2003 data). Remittances are the
second largest source of income for households after wages (World Bank 2003).
Table 11 in Appendix provides details on the size of remittances in relation to various
items in the balance of payments of Tajikistan.
2 Definition of “currently employed status” is based the 2003 TLSS, Module 5, part
A, questions 1-3, 5 and 6. This definition is consistent with the ILO definition of
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http://www.izajold.com/content/1/1/8employment (http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=764. Accessed: September 25,
2012) that includes individuals above certain age who were employed (worked for at
least one hour) during a specified short period of time of either one week or one day.
The employment categories include paid and self-employment.
3 We also estimated regressions with “workforce participation” as a dependent variable
and the results were very similar to those reported for “employed in the last 14 days”.
4 The calculation of non-wage income is based on Lokshin and Glinskaya (2009: page
493, ft 9). The non-wage income includes pensions for old-age, disability, survivors’
pension, special merit, social pensions, pensions based on years of experience, compen-
sation to victims of Chernobyl, Afghan veterans and any other allowances not men-
tioned (2003 TLSS: Module 7, part C).
5 Yang and Choi (2007) show that remittances are positively related to negative
shocks and thus are countercyclical.
6 Azzari and Zezza (2011) also used other community level measures of migration,
such as share of males to females ages 20-39 in 2003 and the number of households in
a community who speak Russian as a second language. These two variables are likely to
be also correlated with the demand for and supply of labor, and therefore we do not
use them as instruments.
7 In the 2003 TLSS survey instrument, such individuals and institutions are defined
as “donors”.
8 According to Bliss (2010: 276), the Tajik government imposed a blockade on food
supplies to GBAO as Pamiri who populate the region initially were allied with the
Gharmi opposition forces. Bliss notes that few Pamiri actually fought against the gov-
ernment forces but by association were targeted which led to murder of many Pamiri
in Khatlon and Dushanbe and the flight of Pamiri to GBAO protected by the moun-
tains. His account is also supported by HRW (1993, 1995) reports of targeted killings
and disappearances of Pamiri men in Khatlon region and in Dushanbe.
9 The conflict events are defined as reports of destruction of communities and infra-
structure, fighting between the government forces and the opposition, violence against
civilians, forced displacement, killings, assassinations, kidnappings, and targeted mur-
ders committed by the opposition or government supporters. For more details about
the conflict see Shemyakina (2012), Appendix A.
10 Vechernii Dushanbe (Evening Dushanbe) and Narodnaya Gazeta (People’s
Newspaper).
11 The excluded districts in Kulob zone are Baljuvon, Khovaling, Muminobod and
Temurmalik (former Sovetskii). Only the last two districts were surveyed in the 2003 TLSS.
12 The Tajik Living Standards Survey (TLSS) data are available at http://go.worldbank.
org/X0OZBE6PJ0.
13 The 2003 data do not contain socio-demographic information on migrants who were
abroad at the time of the survey and who sent remittances and thus we are not able to
control for these in our analysis. The only information available on individual migrants is
their relationship to the household head. Most migrants fall into one of three categories:
the household head himself or herself, and spouses and children of household heads.
14 The cut-off points are based on the census data which are presented by age sub-groups.
15 Kulob group of districts includes Kulob (also Kulyab), Kulob-city, Vose, Temurmalik
(former Sovetskii), Farkhor, Hamadoni (former Moskovskii), Shurobod (also Shuroobod),
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http://www.izajold.com/content/1/1/8Muminobod, Khovaling, Baljuvon and Danghara districts. The remaining districts in
Khatlon belong to Kurgan-Tube zone (also called Kurgan-Tube group of districts).
16 We also used workforce participation instead of employment and the results are
very similar.
17 The estimated coefficients on the control variables have similar signs to those reported
in the literature. Married men/women are more/less likely to be in the workforce. Labor force
participation increases with age, and is higher for more educated people and those who live
in rural areas. Rural men and women are more likely to participate in the labor force. Women
and men from larger households are less likely to be employed. The estimated coefficients on
the dependency ratio and the indicator for female household head are not statistically signifi-
cant. Non-labor income has a negative and statistically significant impact on male labor force
participation and has no statistically significant impact on female labor supply.
18 We use an actual number of remitters instead of dummy variables for having a re-
mitter because the actual number allows us to exploit a variation in the number of
remitters in the analysis.
19 As all of our regressions include district-level fixed effects, we cannot include ‘con-
flict region’ as a level variable because it is a district-level measure.
20 For the set of control variables, the sign and significance levels of the estimated re-
gression coefficients on the set of control variables in Table 8 are similar to the estimates
in Table 7. The number of labor hours supplied increases with age, education and resi-
dence in the rural area and decreases for these coming from large households. Married
men/women work longer/shorter hours respectively. The effect is larger for women. Non-
wage income has negative and statistically significant effect on the hours worked by men
but not by women. The estimated coefficients on the dependency ratio and a dummy for
female household head are not statistically significant in any of the regressions.
21 Wives of Tajik migrants surveyed by the IOM (2009) noted that the remittances
received were not sufficient to pay for basic expenditures, some of them received no
remittances at all, and that the frequency of remittances varied. Since remittances were
not sufficient, many women had to find other ways to provide for themselves and move
in with their extended families or in-laws (IOM 2009).
22 Unfortunately, the 2003 TLSS survey does not allow us to distinguish migrants
who were abroad at the time of the survey.
23 Between 1998 and 2003, an average monthly wage in Tajikistan was between 7 and 21
USD, and an average wage in Russia was between 66 and 306 U.S. dollars (IMF 2001, 2005).
24 A third (164 out of 483, or 34 percent) of former male migrants indicated they
were neither working or had looked for a job in the past 30 days. 25.0 percent indicated
that they are "housewives", 20.1 percent - that there were no jobs, 20.1 percent - "other
reason", 12.2 percent said that they do not want to work and 6.7 percent said that they
were in school. Among the 49 former female migrants, 22 did not work or look for
work at the time of the survey. Among them 81 percent were housewives, and the rest
indicated that they were either in school or did not want to work with the number
equally split between these two.
25 In Tajikistan wives of migrants typically live with their in-laws and are not consid-
ered to be heads of their households when the husband is absent. The in-laws typically
assume this duty and take over control over remittances sent by their sons (ODIHR -
OSCE 2012: p 6).
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Table 11 provides details on the size of remittances in relation to various items in the
balance of payments of Tajikistan.Table 11 Migrant remittances and their relative size in Tajikistan balance of payments
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Net Migrant Remittances 0 −1 65 82 133 321
Inflows 1 4 78 146 252 465
Outflows −1 −5 −13 −64 −119 −144
Gross remittances/ Exports, (percent) 0 1 11 18 23 42
Gross remittances/ Trade Deficit, (percent) 3 3 63 72 167 146
Gross remittances/ FDI, (percent) 3 47 356 456 93 852
Gross remittances/ Net Borrowing, (percent) 2 70 560 456 −149 932
Gross remittances/ Gross Reserves ,(percent) 1 4 82 108 133 207







Difference in means (2)-
(3)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age, years 32.63 32.92 32.45 0.47 **
Female 0.51 0.50 0.51 −0.02 *
Married (indicator) 0.63 0.66 0.61 0.05*
Education 10.13 10.48 9.92 0.56***
N hours worked 25.76 28.32 24.17 4.15***
N obs 14521 6284 8237
Worked last 14 days
(indicator)
0.58 0.57 0.58 −0.01***
In the workforce (indicator) 0.60 0.60 0.59 0.01***
N obs 13903 6041 7862
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Data source: Authors’ calculations using TLSS (2003.)Competing interests
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